XXV Edition

1-2 December 2016"

Information, Stochastic Dominance and Bidding: the Case of Treasury Auctions

Leoni Patrick, Kedge Business School

We explore the link between informativeness of signals, stochastic dominance and equilibrium bids in a multi-unit auction with risk averse bidders. We show that for a particular class of signal distributions, there is a one-to-one relation between informativeness and conditional rst-order stochastic dominance, so that higher degree of informativeness in the signal-fundamental distribution corresponds to higher bids and therefore higher revenues. Finally, we consider a Walrasian bookbuilding auction and show that in such an auction, bidders may collude to push the price down to the seller's reservation price, regardless of the signals.

Area: Capital Structure and Corporate Finance

Keywords: Common value auctions, informativeness, stochastic dominance

Paper file

University Network